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Abstract
This research explores the ways values, power,
and politics shape and are shaped by digital
infrastructure development through an in-depth study
of HathiTrust’s “dark history,” the period of years
leading up to its public launch. This research
identifies and traces the emerging and iterative ways
that values were surfaced and negotiated, decisionmaking approaches were strategically modified, and
relationships were strengthened, reconfigured, and
sometimes abandoning through the process of
generating a viable, robust and sustainable
collaborative digital infrastructure. Through this
history, we gain deeper understandings and
appreciations of the various and sometimes
surprising ways that values, power, and politics are
implicated in digital infrastructure development.
Shedding light on this history enables us to better
contextualize and understand the affordances,
limitations, and challenges of the HathiTrust we
know today, better envision its range of possible
futures, and develop richer appreciations for digital
infrastructure development more broadly.

1. Introduction
Digital infrastructure (“DI”) undergirds the
platforms, applications, tools, and systems that are
increasingly
ubiquitous,
indispensable,
and
inseparable parts of life. In contrast to the more
public-facing interfaces they support, DI operates
beneath the surface, collecting, organizing, and
processing data in ways that are difficult to observe
and, in many cases, understand and critically
evaluate.
This work contributes to understandings of the
roles of values, power and politics in DI development
through a qualitative study of HathiTrust (“HT”). In
2008, HT was introduced to the public as a shared
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digital repository (“SDR”) jointly launched by the
twelve-university consortium known as the
Committee on Institutional Cooperation (“CIC”) and
the eleven university libraries of the University of
California System [9]. Emphasizing shared values
around information preservation and access and
shared traditions around institutional cooperation, HT
sought to combine, coordinate and leverage the
distributed, independent digitization efforts of its
members in the creation of a new DI supporting the
“collective collection.” In the eight years that have
passed since its launch, HT has evolved far beyond
these origins. Today, HT has over one hundred
institutional partners working cooperatively to sustain
and innovate on a DI supporting a growing corpus
that, as of this writing, contains over fourteen million
digitized print volumes.
These snapshots of HT do not, however, reflect or
reveal much about how or why it came to be or came
to become this HT. This research describes some of
these processes through a telling of HT’s “dark
history”— the years HT’s progenitors spent behind
closed doors gestating the digital infrastructure. As
with DI development more generally, HT emerged
through iterative negotiations, demonstrations and
challenges of power, and political posturing and
participation. Through this history, we gain deeper
understandings and appreciations of the various and
sometimes surprising ways that values, power, and
politics shape and are shaped by technical, social, and
legal/policy concerns in DI development. Shedding
light on this history enables us to better contextualize
and understand the affordances, limitations, and
challenges of the HT we know today and better
envision its range of possible futures.
This paper begins by reviewing relevant prior
work, drawing primarily on digital infrastructure,
digitization and digital library literatures and
describing the research methods used. Focus then
shifts to HT’s emergence, organized around three key
moments or turning points in its development where
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the interplay of values, power and politics proved
determinative in the outcome: (1) the decision to join
Google’s mass digitization project (“MDP”), (2)
developing the initial digital infrastructure that would
become the technical backbone of HT, and (3)
fleshing out the social and political dimensions of HT
as a semi-autonomous collective organization
operating beneath a persistent partial institutional
umbrella. The paper concludes by reflecting on the
spectrum of ways values, power and politics
influenced the emergence and evolution of HT and
briefly noting possible implications for HTs future
and the future of digital infrastructures more broadly.

2. Related Literature
This research draws upon digital infrastructure,
digitization, library and information science, and
organizational sensemaking literatures.
In
combination, this prior work offers helpful insights
into current understandings of DI in the library
digitization and signals potential gaps in
understandings with regard to the roles of values,
power and politics.
Sociotechnical systems and infrastructure
literatures provide an overarching guiding
perspective for this research. The work of Hughes
[13] and Bijker [1] are instructive in their emphasis
on the social construction of technology and the indepth descriptive methods used to tease out and
foreground the multidimensional, dynamic, and
mutually constitutive web of role of values, power
and politics in infrastructure development. Echoing
observations made by Kling [16], Edwards and
colleagues hone in on some of the particular
challenges and tensions slow-moving, self-preserving
institutions like libraries face when they attempt to
translate their deeply engrained traditions, practices,
and values to a new digital environment:
“Transformative infrastructures cannot merely be
technical; they must engage fundamental changes in
our social institutions, practices, norms and beliefs as
well” [6:13]. The work of Star [19], Ribes [18],
Bowker [2] and others offer insights useful for
conceptualizing scale — in terms of size, time and
zone of influence — in studies of infrastructure
development, reminding us that DI like HT do not
spring up as de novo fully fleshed forms but rather
draw upon and interoperate with much older
information and communication practices, norms,
and technologies and therefore their study demands
sensitivity to the “long now” of DI development.
Law, library and information science have also
explored important aspects of DIs including, most

notably, risks and affordances of large-scale
digitization efforts (e.g. Google’s MDP) and
associated public interest and social justice
implications. For example, Vaidhyanathan discussed
potential of the MDP in light of a copyright
disequilibrium wrought by new digital technologies
and hypothesized that a hasty over-reliance on fair
use would not only risk derailing the MDP but could
significantly undermine future library digitization
efforts as well [21, 22]. Grimmelmann has written
extensively on the (ultimately unsuccessful) Google
Books Settlement and the dangers associated with
concentration in the market for digital access to print
materials particularly when much of the material is
out-of-print [7, 8]. Numerous library and information
science studies have sought to position Google and
library digitization projects in relation to each other
using a variety of values and metrics. Problems and
challenges associated with quality, integrity, and
access have been addressed in the context of metadata, preservation, and search [3, 4, 5, 22]. Citing the
overwhelming discourse and rhetoric about the
relative “open vs. closed” nature of many digitization
projects, Leetaru undertook a comparative analysis of
the digitization efforts of Google and the Open
Content Alliance finding, in practice, that distinctions
between open and closed may be more superficial
than commonly assumed [17]. Noting the power of
knowledge infrastructures to differentially shape,
generate and distribute knowledge and justice,
Hoffman has conducted a number of studies that
describe and critique the MDP on the basis of its
negative implications for gender equality and
concerns around self-respect, finding that these
interests had been promoted by traditional library
practices but did not appear to receive adequate
support or protection under Google. [10, 11, 12].
Although he did not address digitization or
libraries specifically, Weick’s work on organizational
sensemaking processes provides both theoretical and
methodological guidance for identifying and making
sense of the ways that values, power and politics
factor into the social construction of digitization and
DI [23, 24]. Weick stresses, for example, that
sensemaking is the primary site where meanings
materialize that inform and constrain organizational
identity and action [23]. In particular, important
linkages are drawn between action (what Weick calls
“behavioral commitments”) and processes of posthoc rationalization and justification.
Decisionmaking and sensemaking are entangled in dynamic
and continuously evolving processes of social
interaction that, over time, become more ordered,
stable, and resilient to criticism. Jones elucidated
many of these processes in the context of libraries
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and library digitization noting, in particular, the
importance of naiveté in jump-starting difficult
projects and the eventual, almost centripetal return to
domain expertise as a means of bringing the projects
to fruition and (back) into alignment with traditional
library goals, values, practices, and expectations [14,
15].
Informed by these rich and synergistic literatures,
this study describes the various way that values,
power, and politics shaped and were shaped by the
emergence of HT filling some of the existing gaps in
understanding by providing detailed descriptive
linkages to organizational sensemaking and decisionmaking processes.

The story of HT’s emergence is organized around
three key moments or turning points: (1) the
University of Michigan’s (“UM”) decision to join the
Google’s MDP, (2) developing the initial digital
infrastructure that would become the backbone of
HathiTrust, and (3) fleshing out the organizational
and institutional aspects of HathiTrust prior to its
launch. Each turning point is discussed in turn.

3. Methods

Although its official launch was not until the fall
of 2008, HT’s origin story began many years earlier
when, during a visit to his alma mater in 2002,
Google co-founder Larry Page met with librarians at
UM to discuss a possible joint digitization venture.
From the start, the MDP was deeply contentious.
Murmurings of the project sparked wild speculation,
vehement commentary, and strident debate amongst a
variety of stakeholders. Objections were levied on
the basis of copyright law and policy, economic
grounds, access and quality of information issues,
how the project might affect traditional library values
and practices, and myriad social justice concerns.
Given this background context, a reasonable jumping
off point might be to ask: How does a traditionally
risk averse institution like UM decide to undertake
such a politically risky, potentially costly, and legally
precarious activity as digitizing its entire (roughly six
million volume) print library? Several key patterns of
justifications emerged through the interviews
conducted for this study.

This research seeks to contribute to
understandings of the ways that values, power, and
politics shape and are shaped by emerging DI
through a qualitative study of HT’s emergence and
evolution. The primary data for this study were
generated from in-depth semi-structured interviews
with
individuals
involved
in
HathiTrust’s
development. In total, thirty-two participants were
interviewed for this study representing sixteen
difference institutional/organizational affiliations.
The majority of participants were directly involved in
HT but several individuals with competing and/or
marginalized interests were also interviewed as were
outside individuals with expertise on digitization and
copyright law but no formal association with HT.
Across the different institutions represented,
participants’ roles varied and included: current and
former university provosts, university librarians,
chief information officers, librarians and staff, and
advisors, employees, and/or members of HT.
Data coding and analysis followed an iterative,
inductive approach. As patterns and themes emerged
from the data, interview questions were refined to
reflect new considerations and points of possible
controversy. A process of member checking was
used to further test emerging theories, ensure highquality reporting, and reorganize and refine themes,
patterns, and findings as they emerged. Findings of
this study are organized as a diachronic narrative
using a storytelling approach. Key observations and
analytic reflections are interwoven into the
description rather than pulled out as a separate
discussion section. The concluding section of this
paper does, however, briefly summarize and
synthesize key findings.

4. The Dark History of HathiTrust

4.1. UM-Google Partnership
One of the ways the law gets changed is that it
gets broken.
–co-creator of HT

4.1.1. Digitization is inevitable. Mass digitization
was not seen as a goal but a given. Participants were
not grappling with if but rather when and how digital
conversion of the print library would happen. One of
the librarians at UM explained, “For libraries and
librarians it’s as if digitization is written into our
DNA. It is what we have to do.”
This technological determinism was widespread
amongst many in the research library community but
it was not universally adopted by the broader
community of stakeholders. For example, some were
concerned that projects like the MDP might
undermine the livelihood of authors and damage the
knowledge economy. Well-respected research has
lent credence to the tendency and associated risks of
conflating technological progress with progress more
generally, particularly when a new technology seems
to ignore or fail to accommodate key aspects of the
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social environment in which it operates [16]. When
there is a mismatch or imbalance between
technological change, social norms, and shared
expectations and practices, technological “progress”
can have a paradoxically deleterious effect on
existing social relations and structures.
By in large, decision-makers at UM did not find
those sorts of arguments compelling.
A key
administrator at UM who played a central role in
forging the UM-Google partnership explained:
The fact that the Google Library Project causes
some people to grow concerned about their
livelihood is ultimately a moral argument, not an
economic one.
Concerns that mass digitization would undermine
existing business models that have enabled some
members of the literary and publishing world to
flourish economically was not, without more, a
compelling justification for resisting change.
4.1.2. Digitization is moral. While the purported
moral arguments in support of preserving the status
quo were dismissed as invalid bases for rejecting the
MDP, a moral argument of a different sort was
advanced as a justification for the decision to join the
MDP. Several HT progenitors reflected on the
“strong belief in the inherent rightness” of digitizing
books so they might become more accessible to
society. In addition, participants emphasized a
utilitarian justification saying that, as a matter of
principle, we should not permit the interests of the
few to hold back the progress of society as a whole
simply because they feel entitled to, have grown
accustomed to, or have become dependent on the
continued enjoyment of the benefits that accrued to
them under an old or outdated regime. UM’s Chief
Librarian explained:
Goddammit, I want there to be a mechanism
where almost everybody in the world has access to
almost everything that has ever been published in
electronic form at zero marginal cost, perhaps with
some subscription fee, but a fairly small one. That is
what I think the world ought to look like. For
academic work, I think that marginal cost and the
subscription fee should probably both be zero. The
Google project showed me a feasible path to get
there, not a complete path, but the starting point.
Let's digitize a whole bunch of stuff so that all that
prevents it from being available in the way I'd like it
to be available is law and custom. I was optimistic
that if we, as a society, have valuable assets, then we,
as a society, will figure out how to use them. That
was the utopian goal.

These sentiments reflect a shared ideology and set
of core values held by key decision makers at UM
that drove the decision to join the MDP.
4.1.3. Joining the MDP is pragmatic. Large-scale
digitization efforts had been undertaken long before
the MDP but these efforts were often plagued by a
host of recurring challenges. In particular, projects
were often swallowed by constant budgetary
pressures and the endless creep of technological
obsolescence. By offering to cover virtually all of
the costs, complete the project on an extremely fast
timeline, and provide some technical reassurances in
the form of batch updates and other modest
maintenance support Google’s proposal ameliorated
many of these legacy challenges.
Partnering with Google had pragmatic appeal but
HTs progenitors were not convinced that the MDP
would succeed. In fact, it was not obvious at the
outset what “success” even meant. A co-creator of
HT recalled:
We didn’t have everything all figured out from the
get-go. We knew that this was a great opportunity
and we wanted to seize it but we weren’t exactly sure
what we were going to end up doing with the scans.
Google’s financial and technological support, and
its engineering throughput, was a leap in the right
direction. With a long history of stalled and failed
digitization projects fading in the rearview,
participants appreciated the pragmatic appeal of a
partnership with Google.
Google might not
guarantee success, whatever that might mean, but it
might effectively ensure that this digitization project
grows too big to fail.
4.1.4. Joining the MDP adds reputational value.
UM’s decision to partner with Google was also
motivated by a sense that doing so would add
reputational value to the institution and, by proxy, to
the state.
A senior administrator involved in
negotiating the UM-Google agreement said:
There was a very strong feeling of Michigan
exceptionalism on the part of key players that this is
the kind of thing that Michigan does and we should
do it. The bravery of UM’s President was really
laudable. I don’t know whether she herself really
thought it through but she was basically unafraid.
The digitization project resonated with her. It was a
risk she was willing to take. She said, ‘We’re going
to go ahead and do this. We’re going to partner with
Google. We’re going to scan all these books. We’re
going to create this thing.’ If you were trying to
identify a signature of her presidency, I think this is
it.
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Partnership with Google, one of the world’s most
dynamic and innovative companies, bolstered UM’s
sense of exceptionalism and fed into its unique role
and position vis-à-vis the economic well-being of the
State.
4.1.5. Joining the MDP as a form of advocacy. The
decision to join the MDP was also an exercise of
advocacy around copyright law and policy. A senior
administrator during the Google negotiations who
now heads an academic research library said:
I argued in favor of partnering with Google
because it was a move that would force theories.
Either people would be silent about it and they would
be okay with it or it would force a fair use case that
would be on favorable terms for us, assuming we did
it right. I remember being very concerned that we
either use fair use or we lose it. We were looking at
the question prospectively rather than just reactively.
Short of licensing something, there is no way to
guarantee you won’t become a test case for fair use.
The only way that you can determine that your use
was, in fact, definitively a fair use, is to have a judge
tell you that. Part of the challenge around copyright
cases is, for the most part, publishers pick cases that
they think they will win, and then use those decisions
to narrow the scope of fair use. And the Google
Library Project felt to me, at least intuitively, like …
Man, if we're going to have a discussion about fair
use then this is the project to have a discussion of fair
use around.
A co-creator of HT shared in that sentiment:
This is probably the showdown that we’ve all
known had to happen. And if we lose, it’s not over.
And if we win, it probably is over. I didn’t ever hear
it said but I think there were quite a few people who
thought that this is the last chance for people who are
really opposed to us digitizing the stuff at all to
prohibit us from doing that.
As a land grant institution, UM would likely enjoy
some immunity against monetary damages for
copyright infringement but those protections did not
weigh heavily on the decision of whether or not to
partner with Google. A senior administrator said:
We wanted to have the fight on the terms of the
fight not because we have sovereign immunity and
can’t be held liable for infringement. Sovereign
immunity really served as a safety valve. In the event
that everything went down in flames at least they
couldn’t get damages.
The potential copyright risks dissuaded a number
of institutions from joining the MDP and, of those
that did join, the majority avoided digitizing works
well-within copyright. By contrast UM adopted an
aggressive approach, digitizing its entire library;

roughly two-thirds of its approximately six million
volume collection was believed to be in-copyright.
This choice was partially motivated by a desire to
advocate for fair use on behalf of libraries and library
digitization efforts.
By breaking the UM-Google partnership down
into its key justifications we can begin to see some of
the various subtle and overt overlapping ways that
values (library digitization is part of our DNA/
digitization is moral), power (UM-Google agreement
reflected a strategy/pragmatic partnership/UM
exceptionalism) and politics (digitization as copyright
advocacy/first-mover advantage) played in HT’s
origin story. Once the decision to partnership with
Google had been made, a new host of opportunities,
challenges, and tensions emerged.

4.2. Solving an Instrumental Problem
Google scanned the bulk of UM’s library in a
leased industrial facility on the outskirts of Ann
Arbor. Nearly all aspects of the scanning project —
the precise location, the process, the technologies
used — were kept strictly confidential even from key
UM personnel. Google collected truckloads of books,
drove them offsite for scanning, and returned them to
the library in perfect order, ready for reshelving. The
average turnaround time for a given book was
approximately one week and, at its height, Google
scanned approximately 30,000 volumes from UM’s
library each week. As a point of reference, it took the
most aggressive and technologically advanced library
digitizers a decade to scan less than what Google was
able to scan each week.
4.2.1. The Initial DI As scans started flooding in,
UM realized it needed a place to put them and so it
funded and created an initial DI relatively quickly. A
senior information officer at UM called the resulting
DI a “forcing function of the thing itself.” Almost as
quickly as it was created, participants became
increasingly concerned that the DI did not provide
adequate robust security assurances:
Everyone knew that, to do it responsibly, there
had to be a second instance located offsite so that
problems that hit you aren’t likely to hit them.
It was only after UM had its digital back-up copy
of the library, and had built a DI to support it, that it
realized it was technically and organizationally
under-equipped to deal with the instrumental
challenges raised by this new DI. Recognizing that
as more partners joined the MDP the need for a
secure, trusted, digital repository would grow within
the broader research library community, UM hoped it
could leverage its initial DI to attract the partners it

2361

needed to fund a much-needed second instance at
another institution.
A co-creator of HT realized early on that the
optimal solution was a single high-quality DI,
funded, supported and shared by additional library
partners. The lead architect of the UM-Google
partnership and co-creator of HT reflected:
The infrastructure had to be done right. It had to
be done in a way that people looked at it and said to
themselves, ‘This is something we can’t not do, but
we can’t afford to do it on our own and we don’t
need to do it on our own. We can partner with these
guys and it will get taken care of.’ If every institution
tries to do their own version, it won’t be done well.
But if we have a single infrastructure, we can do it at
a high quality and we can afford to bring in other
people. Michigan is already supporting this thing
quite well, we just need another instance somewhere
else.
A DI initially built to solve an instrumental need
of a single institution was now being positions as a
central node of a far more expansive, collaborative
DI — a shared digital repository (“SDR”) — that
would serve the common needs and interests of the
library community.
4.2.2. Values, Power & Politics in Creating the
Second Instance UM turned first to its affiliates in
the CIC for support in creating the newly
reenvisioned SDR. Reflecting on the social and
political capital built up within the consortium, a
senior information officer said, “We’re good at
sharing with each other and building things together.
We recognize the advantages of economies of scale.”
The CIC seemed to be on board in principle but the
creation of a SDR was not a high priority for its
membership. A senior administrator at UM recalled:
There was no urgency within the CIC about this
and, as a result, discussions about the creation of a
CIC SDR were vague and moving quite slowly. What
would the shared digital repository be? Would it be
a CIC project? Would it be a project of some
university? Were there other universities involved?
Would it be a project of a consortium of universities?
How are we going to determine the governance, write
the bylaws, and so forth?
A rift characterized by many involved in the
negotiations as a “clash of cultures” began forming
between technologists and librarians at the various
CIC institutions. From the librarians’ perspective,
their hesitant, slow-moving, detail-oriented decisionmaking process reflected a culture of collectivism
and egalitarianism that was integral to the identity of
librarians and which libraries had thrived upon for
centuries. The approach reflected a sense of the
gravity of their professional responsibility and

respect for the status of libraries and librarians in
society as the trusted stewards of our shared cultural
record.
From the technologists’ perspective,
however, the librarians were “pecking this thing to
death.” A co-creator of HT who straddled the line
between librarian and technologist referred to the
CIC discussions as a “Zeno’s paradox” whereby the
task of creating the SDR was being broken down into
an infinite number of smaller tasks, effectively
rendering completion of the ultimate goal impossible:
We were 99% of the way there but the rest of the
way was very clearly going to be something that we
weren’t going to be able to accomplish because
everybody was splitting that last 1%. This was
supposed to be the meeting where we made the final
commitment! Instead we had library directors
saying, ‘Yeah, it seems kind of pricey, maybe we
shouldn’t have two copies of this. The redundancy
thing gains us something but we can save money if
we don’t do that.’ But we at Michigan had already
committed to that path! It was very clear to us that
we needed to have two copies and a back-up to make
it viable.
UM needed the SDR to move forward but it did
not have the necessary funding to do it on its own.
The CIC had funds but was paralyzed by the details.
Negotiations were stuck and participants at UM
urgently believed they needed to find a way to move
things forward.
4.2.3. A Charmed Relationship Saves the SDR
Less than twenty-four hours after negotiations stalled
with the CIC, UM had its solution. A senior
administrator at UM reached out to a friend and CIO
at Indiana University (“IU”) and, through a couple of
brief phone calls over a matter of hours later, the two
institutions had negotiated a deal to jointly fund the
SDR. The CIO at IU recalled:
I got a call from the CIO of Michigan saying,
‘Our Librarian is going to call you because the CIC
librarians are really struggling to figure this out.’
Then Michigan’s Librarian calls while I’m changing
planes in Chicago. He knew that I didn’t have a lot
of time and he said: ‘The shared digital repository
governance is fucked. This is not going to happen. I
can find about $600,000 per year at Michigan. Can
Indiana find about $300,000 per year? We’ll tell the
CIC that we’re going to sort this thing out — we’ll be
the operators of the shared digital repository and the
CIC can be its first client. And down the line, we’ll
get this moved to something else, but this is the only
way to get it done.’ I said, ‘Well, I’m very intrigued.
Just let me consult my Librarian. By the next
morning my Librarian had gotten the $300,000 per
year and I had squared things away with general
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counsel. By noon the next day, I called Michigan
back and said ‘Indiana is in.’
UM and IU would move forward with the SDR on
their own without the rest of the CIC. IU agreed
without hesitation to defer to UM on all technical,
administrative and other decisions related to the
project. As IU’s CIO recalled:
I told my guys in research technologies, ‘Go do
whatever Michigan wants.’ And they stood up and
literally turned that thing on in 30 or 60 days. And I
have to credit the strength of Indiana University’s IT
organization because that was a bit of a
countercultural moment in higher education. In
higher education, even in administrative and staff
positions, everybody gets a vote and everybody gets a
say and you have to reach agreement on things.”
Participants at UM and IU credited their “charmed
relationship” for the quick decision-making around
the SDR:
The charmed relationship isn’t structural but
personal. We have a lot of personal connections of
people who have confidence in each other and in
creating good outcomes together. We could jump out
into the unknown, without everything figured out in
advance, and trust that we would both make smart
decisions and solve the obvious emergent problems
together.
Shared values, practices, political temperament,
and attitudes toward the exercise of power
contributed to the “charm.” In particular, participants
cited:
 Common organizational temperament: “Both
institutions have people in key leadership
positions who were more interested in making
things happen. Not just studying it, but making it
happen.”
 Close personal and professional bonds amongst
senior administrators: “We are kindred spirits
and we complement each other.”
 Shared attitudes toward advocacy: “We share the
sense that great public research universities
have to act now or risk becoming less relevant.
That is what drives us.”
 History of successful collaborations including
the Sakai learning management system that has
been adopted by over 350 colleges and
universities around the world: “Institutions feel
like they have to be able to answer every possible
foreseeable question before they take the first
leap. And so that reservoir of personal capital
really helps a lot.”
These and other factors enabled UM and IU to
reach a near-frictionless agreement in the creation of
a SDR, a second instance of the initial DI that would,
in time, ultimately become HT.

4.2.4. Dropping the SDR Bomb
When UM and IU returned to the CIC the
following day and announced their intention to create
the SDR on their own, it sent shockwaves through the
room. One CIC participant recalled:
Oh my God, one day, the CIC is going to do this
and the next day, it’s just Michigan and Indiana. You
can imagine, I mean, whoa, that was like, ‘Hey, what
happened here?!’ It was a bomb!
Another CIC member reflected:
Librarians have a very collectivist culture and for
someone to break out and do something this way was
not only debatable as a strategy, it violated cultural
norms of how librarians tend to do things! And it
violated the governance structure of the CIC!
UM’s Librarian explained his role vis-à-vis the
CIC in the following way:
I was something of a bull in a china shop. I
hadn’t been a University Librarian for very long. I
didn’t know the secret handshakes. I was a former
Provost. I think I was a suspicious character in the
CIC and I think that actually served the whole project
well. I tried to be friendly, and we did give a lot, but
I was unwilling to be hamstrung by the norm of
unanimity that meant so much to my CIC colleagues.
The UM librarian who made the actual
announcement concerning the SDR at the CIC
meeting recalled:
I said, ‘Indiana and Michigan are going to cover
the entire costs between the two institutions and if the
CIC institutions want to come in now, they can be
secondary partners and will pay for part but will not
have a seat at the table in the same way.’ And there
was a catastrophic falling out. One of the library
directors turned his back on the table. Literally
turned his back to me. Lots of people were very
unhappy about it.
Notwithstanding the fallout within the CIC
resulting from the SDR announcement, UM and IU
continued to push ahead with their plan. Key
participants from both institutions met in Indianapolis
to discuss strategies for moving ahead with the
shared DI. Again, in almost frictionless decisionmaking the group chose a name for the repository —
“HathiTrust,” identified a strategy for getting buy-in
from additional institutional partners, sketched out
basic details for what the repository should look like
and how it should operate, and agreed on which
aspects of the project could be shelved until some
future date … all in a day’s work.

4.3. Creation and Launch of HathiTrust
Now that the SDR solved the problem of the
second instance of the initial DI, focus shifted toward
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how UM and IU might navigate the organizational
and institutional fallout and begin to build consensus
and partnership once again around the DI. A senior
administrator at UM and co-creator of HT reflected
that, once the instrument problem had been solved,
My first reaction was ‘What will all of the people
who were involved with this do? Well, they’ll hate
us. They’ll hate Michigan. Anybody we try to bring
in will hate us because we’re so hegemonic. So I
wasn’t worried about the technical side. Michigan
and Indiana had that covered. I was worried about
the organizational side.
One of the ways that UM and IU sought to diffuse
some of the backlash was to assure the CIC that, if
they decided to join they would be held out to the
public as a founding member:
We ultimately gave them a seat on the board and
on the executive committee, and that turned into two
seats in time. So I think they’ve gotten everything
they would have gotten, but the bomb was the thing
that caused them to move forward.
In addition to making amends with the CIC, UM
began working on bringing in additional (non-CIC)
partners. The University of California (“UC”), in
particular, was heavily pursued:
We need to bring in the University of California
because the CIC produces about 10% of the PhDs,
and the University of California produces another
10% of the PhDs. If we’ve got 20% of PhD
construction it will be very hard for the others not to
join. Once the two biggest institutionalized players
are in, we’ll get there.
4.3.1. Appealing to New Partners
Gaining UC’s commitment proved to be a
significant challenge. UC and the California Digital
Library (“CDL”) were global leaders in large-scale
digitization. They had a history of working with the
Internet Archive and Open Content Alliance and
partnering with members of industry including
Microsoft, Yahoo!, the Sloan Foundation and others
prior to joining Google’s MDP. As a senior CDL
administrator described, UC saw itself as “the
intersection of the Venn diagram of digitization:”
We had a great sense of the big picture, of what
people were working on, how far they were, what
kind of challenges they had, how they were thinking
about access and preservation. We really were in the
center of the communication and social side of
digitization efforts.
UC’s institutional identity and self-positioning
had a number of implications (positive and negative)
with respect to the UMs initiative. Weighing in UM’s
favor, the CDL had experienced frustration over the
lack of organizational infrastructure on some of its

prior collaborations: “We were accomplishing
digitization but we were not accomplishing the
infrastructural aspects the libraries needed.” UM and
IU had a proven track record of successfully
implementing collaborative and innovative projects.
In addition, the CDL was concerned about a
misalignment of values between the library
community and private firms like Google, Microsoft,
Yahoo! and others. A CDL representative noted:
The academy traditionally tries to solve problems
like each one of us are an island but the digital favors
scale. Either we figure out how to create scale
ourselves in ways that we can steer in our interest,
and take some advantage of the economics of it, or
others will create scale and they will manage it in
ways that are not in our interest.
The CDL saw value in building a DI by, for and
of research libraries. The SDR would preserve,
organize, and manage the data in a way that was
consistent with library values and practices.
There were also a number of factors that weighed
against the SDR from the perspective of UC and
CDL. UC had intended to develop its own DI and
progress was well underway when it was asked to
consider abandoning it in favor of UM’s which they
viewed, unimpressed, as a regional CIC project. In
addition, the UC system is particularly large and
particularly bureaucratic.
Reaching consensus
among the twelve UC libraries, and between the
libraries and Office of the President (UCOP), is
perhaps even more daunting than reaching consensus
among the CIC.
When the CDL eventually
approached UC’s governing board advocating for UC
to join the initiative, UC took no action. In the view
key administrators at UM, the situation was getting
dire:
It was easy to get the CDL people to join because
this was right up their bailiwick. But it was clear to
me from the start that this wasn’t going to go
anywhere unless we got Berkeley and UCLA on
board. They are by far the biggest pieces of the UC
system in terms of campuses and they have stopped
things repeatedly in the past. If Berkeley and UCLA
gang up they are essentially invincible. So, we didn’t
necessarily need them to say, ‘We’re in. We love it.’
But we at least had to get them to say, ‘We won’t
fight it.’ That took about a year.
UC ultimately did decide to join and its rationale
was twofold. One justification was economic — it
was far more cost effective to share a single DI than
create and support its own. A second justification
dealt with salience and control. As UC sat on UM’s
invitation word began to trickle out that something
big (HT) was about to be announced. If UC wanted
the privileges afforded to founding members, i.e.
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organizational power to shape HT, it had to join now.
Again, UM essentially forced action with an implied
ultimatum. As described by a senior administrator:
We are moving forward with or without you. If
you join us now, we’ll give you a seat at the table, but
if you wait, you won’t get that level of status within
the organization.
As it did with the CIC, the bold exercise of power
paid off in terms of positioning to DI to be a viable
and robust offering for the research library
community. UC joined and UM was able to push the
SDR through a stagnating decision-making process.
The shorter-term instrumental and partnership
problems had been solved. Now its co-creators
looked toward the long now of HT.
For HathiTrust to succeed over the longer term, its
progenitors recognized that UM could not operate the
repository as a dictatorship but must cede control
over to the collective. As one of my participants
described:
The library community is very catty. Because
they’ve been deprived of power for so long they
engage in horizontal violence at the local level. So,
the number one complaint would be that Michigan is
doing this thing that really benefits us so that they
can control us. This was going to be a huge issue.
And so we had to give HathiTrust over to the
members of the community, so that they could settle
upon what HathiTrust might become. We couldn’t
say ‘This is the direction it’s going to go’ because,
even if we were right, it would be prima facie
evidence that we were drunk with power, and mad,
and taking them where they didn’t want to go. We
had a vision, which was that we really needed to
back-up our digital scans, but the rest had to be
settled by the library community.
When HT was formally introduced to the public
in the fall of 2008, it was announced as a SDR jointly
founded by the 12-university consortium known as
the CIC and the 11 libraries of the University of
California system. There was no specific mention of
UM or IU beyond the fact that they were members of
the CIC. UM’s institutional fingerprints were already
fading from the HT creation story, enabling new
meanings to emerge out of the new collective. A UM
librarian observed:
When you’re at Michigan, you see what’s going
on here. It wasn’t until I was at a CIC meeting and
saw people with HathiTrust stickers on their
computers and heard them referring to HathiTrust as
‘We’ rather than as ‘Michigan’ that I realized there
was already this broad sense of collective action
being expressed around HathiTrust. It was really an
amazing thing to see.

6. Conclusion
HT’s dark history reveals the multiple, entangled,
dynamic and sometimes unexpected ways that values,
power, and politics shape and are shaped by the
development of large-scale, collaborative digital
infrastructures. Although much of its early history
was founded upon unilateral and bilateral power
plays that stood in stark opposition to traditional
library values, practices, and governance structures,
these moves were critical to HT’s creation and fed
into its success nearly a decade post-launch. This
history also has implications for libraries and digital
infrastructure more generally. HT’s emergence and
evolution privileges institutional partners that possess
certain traits (i.e. large federated research library with
significant English-language print collection) and
have access to certain resources (i.e. funding and
high quality, reliable broadband Internet) while
effectively excluding other kinds of participants (i.e.
individuals, smaller municipal libraries, private
firms), and other forms of participation (i.e.
membership without contribution and contribution
without membership).
This descriptive account and analysis of a
particular DI reveals some of the ways in which
existing relationships and alliances, shared values and
practices,
organizational
sensemaking
and
institutional structures may become inextricably
bound up and entangled in DI development. The
MDP enabled but did not lead to the HT we see today
in a linear or deterministic sense. Instead, HT
became over time, taking form through a process of
incremental steps, unanticipated challenges and
responses to changing technical, social, and
institutional conditions. Values, power, and politics
were implicated across a sensemaking and decisionmaking spectrum that ranged from overt ultimatum to
strategic nudge to passive self-exile.
Using
descriptive retrospective accounts generated from
participant interviews triangulated against a rich
textual record this research contributes to a more
complete picture of the ways values, social
relationships,
organizational
strategy,
and
institutional politics influence digital infrastructure
development. In particular, it demonstrates the value
in foregrounding and emphasizing some of the
hidden, subtle and more nuanced ways that values,
power, and politics influence digital infrastructure
development.
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